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本帖最后由 小山林卡 于 2017-3-13 17:26 编辑
Lessonsfrom Apple vs. the F.B.I. InApple’s fight with the F.B.I. over iPhone privacy, the two sides appeared to bedefending principles that were both compelling and irreconcilable. 在苹果与联邦调查局关于苹果手机隐私的争论中，双方似乎都在捍卫令人信服又无法调和的原则。 CREDITPHOTOGRAPH BY XINHUA / WANG LEI VIA GETTY
It’s welcome news that the Federal Bureau of Investigationhas dropped its legaleffort to force Apple to help it create a method of accessingdata on a locked iPhone 5C used by Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the perpetratorsof the massacre that took place in December in San Bernardino. Not that theBureau, which ultimately found another means of getting into the phone, didn’thave a legitimate interest in knowing what was on the phone: only an ardentlibertarian would argue otherwise. But the case raised a number of importantissues and conflicting interests that judges alone can’t be, and shouldn’t be,expected to resolve. 一个可喜的消息：FBI已经放弃通过法律手段来要求苹果公司帮助破解赛义德·利兹万·法鲁克，这个去年12 月在圣贝纳迪诺发生的屠杀事件的肇事者之一所使用的iPhone 5C，从而得以访问其数据。这并不是说调查局没有取得手机内容的合法权益，他们最终找到了其他的方式破解了手机：只有激进的自由主义者会对此表示反对。但是案件引发了一些审判员们本人无法、也不应该、不指望能够化解的重要问题和利益冲突。
Curiously enough, the F.B.I. and Apple agreed on this point,if nothing else. “That tension should not be resolved by corporations that sellstuff for a living,” James Comey, the director of the Bureau, said in a post publishedin February at the national-security blog Lawfare. “It also should not beresolved by the FBI, which investigates for a living. It should be resolved bythe American people deciding how we want to govern ourselves in a world we havenever seen before.” In explaining Apple’s decision to appeal a court order thatwas handed down in February, which required the company to help the F.B.I., TimCook told Time magazine,“Somebody should pass a law that makes it clear what the boundaries are. Thisthing shouldn’t be done court by court by court by court.” 奇怪的是，FBI和苹果公司只在这一点上达成共识. “不应由贩卖商品为生的企业来解决这种紧张关系，”FBI局长詹姆斯·科米2月在国家安全博客Lawfare上发表的一篇博文中说道。“它也不应由以调查为生的FBI来解决。它将由美国人民在一个从未见过的世界里来自己管理解决。”在解释2月苹果公司因法院要求其协助FBI而上诉的决定时，蒂姆·库克告诉《时代周刊》，“有些人应该通过制定一项法律来弄清界线，但这件事绝不能由法院来做主。”
Of course, merely calling for a political solution doesn’t help us todecide what one should look like. If there were a simple legal or technologicalresolution that satisfied the demands of both sides, it would already have beenadopted. The reason the San Bernardino case was so contentious was that, atfirst glance, the two parties appeared to be defending principles that wereboth compelling and irreconcilable. 当然，仅仅呼吁一个政治上的结局方案并不能帮助我们决定一个东西应该是什么样子。如果有一个简单的法律或技术解决方案能够满足双方的需求，它将早已被采用。圣贝纳迪诺案争议太大的原因是，乍一看，双方捍卫的原则似乎均是令人信服和不可调和的。
Clearly, after Edward Snowden’srevelations about the extentof U.S. government surveillance of citizens, Americans have ample reason to beconcerned about the surveillance opportunities offered by digital technology,and the possibility that big tech companies are complicit in this spying.Modern smartphones contain all sorts ofpersonal information, from savede-mails to financial records to intimate pictures. Apple, as a leading purveyorof smartphones, has every reason to respond to the privacy concerns of itscustomers. That’s what it did when it incorporated code in iOS that wipes thehard drive when someone enters an incorrect passcode ten times in a row. 显然，在爱德华·斯诺登揭露美国政府监视公民的程度后，美国人有充分的理由担心数字技术与大型科技公司串通一气参与监视的可能性。现代智能手机包含各种个人信息，从保存的电子邮件到财务记录到私密照片。苹果作为智能手机的主要供应商，完全有理由对其客户的隐私问题作出回应。这就是当有人连续十次输入一个不正确的密码后，它将在iOS系统中合并代码以清理硬盘的原因。
Law-enforcement agencies, in seeking to protect the public, also have avital job to do. And they have long had the right to violate people’s personalspace, with a court’s approval. For example, in searching for incriminatingevidence, they can, given a suitably tailored warrant, break down the frontdoor of a person’s home, rip apart walls and floors, and rifle through personalpossessions. They can also make landlords assist them in gaining entry. 执法机构在保护公众时也有一个重要工作要做。他们一直有权利在法院的批准下侵犯人们的个人空间。例如,在寻找罪证时,他们可以给予适当的逮捕令, 通过个人步枪冲破一个人家的前门,撕裂墙壁和地板。他们也可以让房东帮助他们进入。
In the San Bernardino case, the F.B.I.effectively argued (and Sheri Pym, the federal magistrate who handed down thecourt order, effectively accepted), that a cell phone isn’t much different froman apartment, and that Apple isn’t much different from a landlord. The company offered up a number of legal arguments to thecontrary, arguing that it shouldn’t be compelled to write new code that wouldoverride the security features it had designed into a product. Six weeks ofbattling it out in court and the media didn’t resolve this central conflict.But it did illuminate some other important aspects of the issues involved in the case. 在圣贝纳迪诺案中，FBI提出有力的论点（雪莉皮姆，传达法院命令的地方法官，实际上已经接受了这个论点。），一部手机和公寓并没有太大区别，因此苹果公司和一个房东也没有太大区别。苹果公司提供了大量法律上的相反论据，认为它不该被强迫编写新的代码，那会推翻它已经设计进产品的具有安全性的产品特点。。在法院和媒体进行了为期六周的斗争没有解决这个核心的冲突。但它确实说明了有关案件中涉及的其他重要问题。
It now appears as though the F.B.I. seized on the SanBernardino case as an opportunity to pursue a policy agenda that it has had foryears, and that it oversold its case. The agency said that it was unable tounlock the iPhone 5C without Apple’s assistance. But as Daniel Kahn Gillmor, atechnology fellow at the American Civil Liberties Union, pointed out in a blog post publishedon March 7th, this claim didn’t ring entirely true. In his piece, whichincluded pictures of an iPhone 5C’s circuit board, Gillmor described howinvestigators could work around the auto-erase feature by removing thedevice’s NAND flash memory and backing it up, then trying everyconceivable four-digit passcode combination. “If the FBI doesn’t have theequipment or expertise to do this, they can hire any one of dozens of datarecovery firms that specialize in information extraction from digital devices,”he wrote. It’s not known for certain if the F.B.I. used the method thatGillmor recommended to get into Farook’s phone. But the post suggested that theBureau hadn’t exhausted all of the technological possibilities for accessingthe data. This may damage its credibility if it gets into a similar legaldispute in the future. 现在看来，好像是 FBI 抓住圣贝纳迪诺案，并夸大案件以此为契机来推行追求了多年的政策议程。该机构表示，没有苹果的协助它是无法解锁 iPhone 5C的。但丹尼尔·卡恩·吉尔摩，美国公民自由联盟的一个技术研究员在 3 月 7 日发表的一篇博文中指出，这种说法并非完全真实。在他的文章中包含有 iPhone 5C 的电路板图片，吉尔摩描述了调查人员如何通过设备的 NAND 快闪记忆和备份解决自动擦除功能，然后尝试所有可能的四位数密码组合。他写道：“如果FBI没有设备或专业知识做到这点，他们可以从众多专门从事从数字设备中提取信息的数据恢复公司中任意聘请一个。”对于FBI是否使用吉尔摩推荐的方法进入法鲁克的手机还不知道。但他的文章表明，FBI还没有用尽所有的技术可能性进行数据访问。如果它在将来陷入类似的法律纠纷，这可能有损它的信誉。
There is also reason to question an argument that Comey hasbeen making in conjunction with the case—that strong encryption protocols,which other technology firms are also deploying, are producing a new “dark”zone that terrorists, criminals, and other bad actors can exploit. Undoubtedly,the encryption measures introduced by Apple and other tech firms since theSnowden revelations have made it easier for people to conceal data inlocked iPhones, encrypted WhatsApp messages, and other protected spaces. Butthe authorities still have the capacity to collect enormous amounts ofinformation. In the San Bernardino case, for example, the investigatorsobtained records from Farook’s employer’s cellular provider, which would haveincluded details of all of the calls he placed on the device, and perhaps hissaved messages. Cook told Time that Apple itself gave the F.B.I. “acloud backup on the phone, and some other metadata.” Law-enforcement officialshave said that they wanted to look at Farook’s list of contacts and any otherremaining data. Apparently, they were concerned that some recent datamight have been missing—it emerged a few weeks ago that Farook may have changed his password, turningoff automated iCloud backups in the process. 此外，也有理由去质疑一个论点，科米已经联同了该案件——其他科技公司也将部署强大的加密协议，生产出一种恐怖分子、犯罪分子和其他不良行为者可以利用的新“黑暗”区。毫无疑问，苹果和其他科技公司推行了加密措施，自斯诺登启示了人们更容易隐藏数据在锁定的iphone中，加密的WhatsApp消息中和其他受保护的空间中，但当局仍有能力收集大量信息。例如在圣贝纳迪诺县案中，调查人员从法鲁克雇主的手机供应商中获得记录，其中会包括所有在设备上呼叫的详细信息，也许还有他保存的信息。库克告诉《时代周刊》,苹果已经给了FBI“关于手机和一些其他元数据的云备份。”执法人员说，他们想看看法鲁克的联系人列表和其他剩余的数据。 显然，他们担心的是最近的一些数据可能已丢失——它几周前暴露出法鲁克可能改了密码并关闭自动iCloud备份的过程中。
Apple, and the companies and organizations that submittedamicus briefs in support of Apple’s position, argued that itwas impractical and risky to try and create a pass-through on aone-off basis. This sounds like a strong argument, but it needs to be exploredfurther. Were Apple and its allies saying that they can’t be trusted to keeptheir own security protocols safe? Or were they arguing that it is impossibleto design an encryption protocol that can be breached by its creator, but noone else? In pledging to fight the court order, Apple used the firstargument, saying, “The only way to guarantee that such a powerfultool isn’t abused and doesn’t fall into the wrong hands is to never create it.”Earlier this month, in an open letter toPresident Obama, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which is supporting Apple,appeared to be invoking the second argument. “You can’t build a backdoorinto our digital devices that only good guys can use. Just like you can’t put akey under a doormat that only the FBI will ever find,” the letter read.
苹果公司和支持它而提交非当事人陈述的公司或组织认为在一次性基础上创建一个直通是不切实际和冒险的尝试。这听起来像是一个有力的论据，但需要进一步的探索。苹果和它的盟友们在说他们不能被信任去保证自己安全协议的安全吗？或是他们认为不可能设计一个可以由它的创造者而不能被其他人攻破的加密协议吗？为了争取法院的命令，苹果使用的第一个论据是，“为了保证这样一个强大的工具不被滥用、不落入坏人之手的唯一途径是不创造它。” 第二个论据似乎援引自本月初--在支持苹果的电子前沿基金会给奥巴马总统的一封公开信，“你不能建立一个只有好人才能使用，进入我们数字设备的后门，就像你不能把一个钥匙放到一个只有FBI才能找到的门垫下。”
Some experts found Apple’s position that it was acting inorder to protect privacy rights to be less than convincing. In a post atLawfare, Susan Hennessey and Benjamin Wittes, two scholars at the BrookingsInstitution, described the company’s self-presentation as “largelyself-congratulatory nonsense.” Hitherto, Hennessey and Wittes noted, Apple hadstrongly opposed legislation that might have clarified laws related toencryption. In now arguing that the existing law couldn’t compel it to help thegovernment, the firm was adopting a “near-duplicitous posture” and “trying tocarve out a zone of impunity for itself that rightly alarms the government andshould alarm the very citizens the company (which calls these citizens‘customers’) purports to represent.” 一些专家发现苹果为了保护隐私权的立场不太具有说服力。在Lawfare博客的一个帖子中，布鲁金斯学会的苏珊·亨尼西和本杰明·维特斯两位学者描述了苹果的自述“很大程度上是沾沾自喜的废话”。迄今为止，亨尼西和维特斯指出，苹果强烈反对立法可能已经明确了相关的加密法。现在认为现有法律不能强迫它帮助政府，苹果采取了一种“近两面派的姿态”和“试图为自己开拓一个免罪区，能恰好警告政府又能警告所有公民这个公司（公司将这些公民称之为“客户”）想代表他们的意图。”
With the case dropped, what will happen now? One option wouldbe for the President and Congress to take up a suggestion Apple has made to“form a commission or other panel of experts on intelligence, technology,and civil liberties to discuss the implications for law enforcement, nationalsecurity, privacy, and personal freedoms.” Ordinarily, there are goodreasons to be skeptical of commissions, which are sometimes used to placate thepublic while, in fact, serving to delay necessary action and preserve thestatus quo. In this case, though, a public airing of the issues, some of whichare technical and complex, could be productive, especially if the commission’sremit was extended to include other companies and their products, and thebroader issue of privacy in the electronic age. 随着案件的解决，现在会发生什么？一种选择是总统和国会采取苹果的建议，“组建一个委员会或其他在情报、科技和公民自由的专家座谈小组，来讨论 对执法、国家安全、隐私和个人自由的影响。”通常情况下，有充分的理由去怀疑委员会有时被用来安抚公众，而事实上这是拖延和维持现状的必要行动。不过，在这种情况下，一个问题被公开，其中的一些技术和复杂性能够有所成效，尤其是如果委员会的职权范围扩大到包括其他公司和他们的产品，以及电子时代里更广泛的隐私问题。
Ever since the early nineteen-nineties,when the Internet was just being widely adopted, the F.B.I. and theNational Security Agency have been arguing that the communications world is“going dark” and depriving them of access to information they needed tosafeguard the public. The revelations from Snowden and others demonstratedthat, in reality, we live in what Peter Swire, a professor of law and ethics atthe Georgia Institute of Technology, has called “agolden age of surveillance.” In arecent report published byHavard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society, a team of experts pointed outthat some powerful trends will continue to “facilitate government access”to personal information. The business models of firms like Facebook and Googledepend on their ability to track user data. New cloud services create yet moreunencrypted data. And the Internet of Things, which will deploy countlessdevices, in all sorts of places, “promises a new frontier for networkingobjects, machines, and environments in ways that we are just beginning tounderstand.” 自从二十世纪十九年代早期，互联网刚被广泛使用，FBI和国家安全局就一直认为通信世界“走出黑暗”，并剥夺了他们访问他们需要保障的公共信息。斯诺登和其他人的揭露表明，在现实中，我们生活在彼得•太古，一位佐治亚理工学院的法学和伦理学教授所称的‘监视的黄金时代’里。” 一个专家小组在一份最近由哈佛伯克曼互联网与社会中心出版的报告中指出，一些强大的趋势将继续“促进政府访问”个人信息。像脸书和谷歌公司的商业模式依赖于他们追踪用户数据的能力。新的云服务创造了更多的未加密数据。物联网将在各种场所调动无数的设备，“用一种我们刚刚开始理解的方式承诺了一个给网络对象、机器和环境的新的未知领域。”
Even in such a data-rich environment, however, the rise of strongencryption is having an impact and creating some hidden areas. There willcertainly be instances when legal authorities want access to encryptedinformation that they can’t get at. Terrorism investigations aren’t theonly example. Absent methods of accessing systems protected by strongencryption, Obama asked a few weeks ago, “What mechanisms do we have to even dothings like tax enforcement? If you can’t crack that at all, if governmentcan’t get in, then everyone’s walking around with a Swiss bank account in theirpocket, right?” 然而，即使在这样一个数据丰富的环境中，强加密的兴起正在影响和创造一些隐蔽的地方。当然有这样的情况：当法律当局要访问加密信息时他们无法得到。恐怖主义调查并不是唯一的例子。缺乏强加密保护下访问系统的方法，奥巴马几周前问道，“什么样的机制是像税收执法一样必须要做的？如果你无法破解，如果政府不能进入，那么每个人都会像在自己的口袋里放一个瑞士银行的账户对吗？”
At this stage, that specific threat may not be too grave. Taxauthorities have sweeping powers to demand bank accounts and other financialrecords. But as encrypted blockchain technologies develop, and perhaps start toreplace regular money, they could create more opportunities for concealment.Regardless, Obama was surely right when he said that the time to confront theseissues is now. If we wait until after the next big terrorist attack, we couldend up with a second Patriot Act. 在这个阶段，具体的威胁可能不是太严重。税务机关拥有广泛的权力去要求银行记录和其他财务记录。但是，随着加密blockchain技术的发展，也许能开始取代常规的钱，他们可以为隐藏创造更多的机会。不管怎样，奥巴马说现在就是去面对对这些问题的时候，是完全正确的。如果等到下一次大的恐怖袭击，我们可能会以第二次爱国者法案告终。
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发表于 2017-3-13 17:26:07
